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This article focuses on independent Marxist feminists in Egypt during the last two 
decades of the twentieth century.∗ I show that despite the Islamist discourses that called 
for women’s withdrawal from public places simultaneously with the demise of state 
feminism, the public sphere was far from monolithic. Independent Marxist Feminists 
attempted to challenge the strictures of gender, and to participate with alternate 
discourses and activism in and through alternate media and public spaces. My goal is to 
shift the attention from Cairo-based politics and movements and to shed light on feminist 
activism in the relatively closed communities in small provincial towns.  
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Introduction  
Inspired by postcolonial theories on gender and alternative modernity, scholars of 
gender in the Middle East have focused on the limitation and demise of state feminism on 
the one hand and the engagement of Islamic traditions to formulate authentic feminism 
on the other hand.2
                                                          
1 Hanan Hammad is an assistant professor of Middle East history at Texas Christian University. She is 
spending the 2010-2011 academic year as the EUME Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin fellow at Zentrum 
Moderner Orient, Berlin. She is currently writing a book tentatively entitled “Mechanizing People: 
Industrialization, Sexuality and Gender in Modern Egypt”.  
 The development of an international agenda concerning women after 
the World Conference on Women in Nairobi at the closure of the UN decade of women 
∗ I would like to thank Intsar Salih and Ibrahim al-Baz for providing me with a copy of Sana’ al-Misri’s 
unpublished manuscript, Ruwwad al-tanwir wa taqadumiyya hasab al-talab [The pioneers of 
enlightenment and progressiveness on demand] and to thank Iman Mersal for providing me with the early 
editions of the Bint al-Ard journal. I also thank Professor Mervat Hatem, all participants in the Alternative 
Publics in the Middle East and North Africa Workshop in the 11th Mediterranean Research Meeting of the 
European University Institute, Florence, in March 2010 and the participants of the PV meeting of the 
Zentrum Moderner Orient, Berlin, on January 13, 2011 for their useful comments on early drafts of this 
article. Of course any shortcoming is my sole responsibility.   
2 On the state, see Mervat Hatem, The demise of Egyptian state feminism and the politics of transition, 
1980-1991 (Los Angeles: Gustave.E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies, University of 
California, 1991) and “Political Liberalization, Gender, and the State” in Political Liberalization and 
Democratization in the Arab World: Theoretical Perspectives, ed. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul 
Noble (Boulder: Lynne Runnier Publishers Inc. 1995). For the Islamists, see Saba Mahmood, Politics of 
Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) and Lara 
Deeb, An enchanted modern: gender and public piety in Shi'i Lebanon (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2006) and “‘Doing Good, Like Sayyida Zaynab’: Lebanese Shi‘i Women’s Participation in the 
Public Sphere,” in Religion, Social Practice, and Contested Hegemonies: Reconstructing the Public Sphere 
Muslim Majority Societies, ed. Armando Salvatore and Mark Le Vine (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005). An important exception dealing with secular feminism is Nadje al-Ali, Secularism, Gender, and the 
State in the Middle East: the Egyptian women’s movement (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000).  
This journal and its contents may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or  
systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form 
to anyone is expressly forbidden. ©2011 Journal of International Women’s Studies.
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in 1985 contributed to shifting the focus onto transnational discourses and activism on 
women’s issues.3 Despite the important contributions of these recent trends in gender 
studies, the image of women’s activism in the Middle East that has emerged through this 
scholarship is overshadowed by the state, Islamists, and transnational activism. Although 
the dominance of these three players is undeniable, it is misleading to assume that 
independent Marxist activism, which enjoyed strongholds in parts of the Middle East in 
the middle of the twentieth century, has become non-existent. To fill the gap in the 
current scholarship, this study deals with Marxist feminists in Egypt who acted 
independently from the state, formal political organizations, and Western funded societies 
in the last decades of the 20th century. These critical decades witnessed the transition 
from state-contained public life to the relatively open public sphere and active civil 
society and the flourishing of Western-funded NGOs. I show that despite the Islamist 
discourses that called for women’s withdrawal from public places simultaneously with 
the demise of state feminism, the public sphere was far from monolithic.4 Marxist 
Feminists were able to challenge the strictures of gender, and to participate with alternate 
discourses and activism in and through alternate media and public spaces.5
This article focuses on the author and activist Sana’al-Misri (1958- 2000) and the 
women’s group Bint al-Ard, “Daughter of the Land”, during the last two decades of the 
twentieth century. Al-Misri’s activism was in Cairo, but the Bint al-Ard Group started in 
the city of al-Mansura and branched off in different towns in Lower Egypt. These 
Marxist women patiently carved their space in a public sphere that seemed almost 
exclusively reserved for patriarchal anti-women and anti-secular discourses. They were 
totally independent from the state, foreign associations, and formal opposition groups. 
This position put them not only in confrontation with an authoritarian regime and its 
Islamists competitors, but also with leftist comrades in the opposition parties and in 
Western-funded organizations. I argue that the conservative discourses against women’s 
rights since the late 1970s by both the state and the Islamists provoked extremist secular 
feminists to break away from the legacy of the Egyptian enlightenment of the late 
nineteenth and early 20th centuries. Instead of advocating women’s rights of education 
and work in order to fulfill practical familial and societal needs within an Islamic 
 My goal is 
also to shift the attention from Cairo-based politics and movements and to shed light on 
feminist activism in the relatively closed communities in small provincial towns.  
                                                          
3 See Valentine Moghadam, Globalizing Women: Transnational Feminist Networks (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2005) and Valentine Moghadam and Fatima Sadiqi, “Women's Activism and the 
Public Sphere: Introduction and Overview”, Journal of Middle East Women's Studies - Volume 2, Number 
2, spring 2006, 1-7. 
4Examples of this Islamist discourse during 1970s and 1980s include: Muhammad Fahmi ‘Abd al-Wahab, 
al-Harakat al-nisa’iyya fi al-sharq wa silatiha bil-ist‘mar wa al-suhyuniyya al-alamiyya [Feminist 
movements in the East and its connections with imperialism and International Zionism] (Cairo: Dar al-
‘Itisam, 1979), Muhammad bin Lutfi al-Sabbagh, Tahrim al-khilwah bil-mar’ah al-ajnabiyyah wa al-
ikhtilat al-mustahtir [Banning privacy with non-relative women and irresponsible mingling] (Cairo: Dar al-
‘Itisam, 1980), and Nadhmi Khalil Abu al-‘Ata, Risalah ila al-ukht al-muslimah fi al-jam’ia [A message to 
Muslim sisters in the university] (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nur, 1987). These books, along with other 
publications produced by Islamist publishing houses, were distributed for free among female students cross 
campuses since late 1970s. 
5 Mary P. Ryan, “Gender and Public Access: Women’s Politics in 19
th 
Century America,” and Nancy 
Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Boston: 
MIT Press, 1992), 259-288 and 109-142. 
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framework, those feminists based women’s rights on the wider human principles of 
absolute gender and class equality. 
The experiences of Sana’ al-Misri and the group of Bint al-Ard provide excellent 
examples of what Salvatore and Le Vine describe as certain categories of people who, 
when excluded from the dominant public sphere, create alternative parallel public spheres 
that must be uncovered and investigated.6 In their tireless attempts to create opportunities 
to penetrate the public sphere and to challenge the hegemonic anti-women discourses, 
Bint al-Ard worked around the irony of a public sphere based on limited accessibility and 
rationality and they endeavored to deploy a strategy to confront distinction and 
exclusion.7 In doing so, they radicalized public places under government control, blurred 
the line between public and private space, and through social networks they pooled 
financial and artistic sources to serve their alternate media. Because this paper deals with 
independent Marxist feminism, it does not deal with Marxist women who were active in 
political parties or in Western funded organizations, such as the Progressive Women’s 
Union that is affiliated with the Tagamu‘ Progressive Party.8
 
 
Sana’ al-Misri… The Radical Individual   
Sana’ al-Misri started her activism as a student in Cairo University and spent a 
month in jail for protesting the authoritarian student bylaws and the demise of state 
welfare policies in the late 1970s. By that time she was already known as a radical 
Marxist, a distinction which directly challenged laws criminalizing communism in Egypt, 
though she was not known to be a member of any underground communist groups. In 
October 1985 she was badly injured by police forces while she was leading a protest 
close to the Israeli embassy in Giza in the wake of Israel’s attack on the headquarters of 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Tunis. Due to her anti-state activism she was 
fired from her work as a journalist in the official al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi magazine. After 
winning a court case to be reinstated she nonetheless declined to return to the magazine 
to keep her independence from the state. She also kept herself independent from all 
opposition political parties, including al-Tagamu‘ Progressive Party, and refused to work 
for its newspaper, al-Ahali. Although she came from an upper middle class Alexandrian 
family, she pursued an ascetic life and lived most of her life in inexpensive female dorms 
in downtown Cairo. This frugality gave her independence from any establishment or 
institution and an ability to remain faithful to her uncompromising views. What was 
unique about al-Misri’s experience was not only her commitment and what could be 
termed her individualist activism, but also the variety of ways she chose to create an 
alternate public sphere for her alternative discourse. She debated Islamists in their own 
forums, led demonstrations in the streets and public places, wrote for non-periodical 
magazines, published books at her own expense, and participated in theater 
performances. Through all these minority media, she advocated egalitarianism between 
men and women, the rich and the poor, Muslims and Christians. She was vocal in 
                                                          
6 Armando Salvatore and Mark Le Vine Religion, Social Practice, and Contested Hegemonies: 
Reconstructing the Public Sphere Muslim Majority Societies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 5. 
7 Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere”, 115.  
8 For the PWU and other secular organizations within political parties and secular activists who accepted 
Western fund, see Nadje al-Ali, Secularism, Gender, and the State in the Middle East: the Egyptian 
women’s movement (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
March 2011
 Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 12 #3 220 
rejection of any “normalization” of relations between Egypt and Israel just as much as 
she raised doubts about Arab nationalism and rejected a theocratic state. She neither 
formed nor joined any sort of “formal” political or intellectual platform. She was “the 
extreme” on many levels. Among leftists she was a Trotskyite, among feminists she 
accepted only secular non-Islamic feminism, and among activists she refused any 
compromise with the establishment.  
In a wide array of interests and activism, al-Misri published her first book, Khalfa 
al-hijab, behind the veil, in 1987 as a strong critique of the Islamist vision of women’s 
issues. This book stemmed from a confrontation between her and the Islamists during a 
debate on Islam and secularism held in Dar al-Hikma, the stronghold of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, in 1986. Her blatant critiques of the lack of equal rights for women, Copts 
and non-Muslim minorities in political Islamist thought angered zealous Islamists so 
much that she had to leave the debate under the protection of several men. In her second 
book on the Muslim Brotherhood and the working class, she broadened the discussion to 
include the subjugation of working class rights.9 In both books she argued that political 
Islamist forces, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, have historically been hostile to the 
rights of women, the working class, and non-Muslim minorities. In a chapter on “a 
woman, a Christian, a laborer, and a poor person,” she warned the reader about what she 
saw as the racism and exclusivity inherent in the Islamist project.10
Her last research project was on the Muslim conquest of Egypt in the seventh 
century. The work was never finished though a second volume did appear posthumously, 
having been prepared for publication by her widower Ibrahim al-Baz. It is difficult to 
accept the second volume as a complete project. Relying heavily on rarely used Coptic 
sources, and providing a new interpretation of medieval Islamic sources, she argued that 
Arab Muslims were not the benevolent conquerors and that Coptic Egyptians did not 
submissively welcome the invaders as described in the customary Muslim account. 
Providing a new reading for Islamic history is not a new project for Egyptian secularists. 
Taha Husayn and Husayn Haykal, among others, launched that project during the liberal 
experiment of the interwar period. Employing European and orientalist approaches these 
secularists provided a critical reading of Islamic sources. Yet, none of them went as far as 
al-Misri did when she depicted life in Mecca as primitive compared to civilized Egypt. 
Reflecting ultra-Egyptian nationalism, she described the journey of the Egyptian 
concubine of the Prophet Muhammad as a move from the Egyptian paradise to the Arab 
hell, and questioned whether Arab racism against the Coptic Marie was responsible for 
her premature death.
 She argued that only 
secular democracy and socialism would allow equal rights for all citizens.  
11 Along with her work on the Christian female laborers and her 
critique and class analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood’s of Muslim capitalism, al-Misri 
emerges as a strong advocate of gender and social egalitarianism in the face of exclusive 
Muslim male dominance.12
                                                          
9 Sana’ al-Misri, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa al-tabaqah al-‘amilah al-Misriyyah, [The Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Egyptian Working Class] (Cairo: without a publisher, 1992).   
 This work on the Muslim invasion of Egypt angered a wide 
range of intellectuals, namely Islamists and Arab nationalists for whom it was an attempt 
10 Sana’ al-Misri, Khalfa al-hijab: Mawqif al-jama‘at al-Islamiyya min qadiyyat al-mar’a [Behind the veil: 
The position of the Islamist groups towards women’s issues] (Cairo: Sina lil-Nashr, 1987).  
11 Sana’ al-Misri, Hawamish al-fath al-‘Arabi: Hikayat la-dukhul [Footnotes of the Arab Conquest: tales of 
penetration] (Cairo: Sina lil-Nashr, 1996), 17- 51. 
12 See Khalfa al-Hijab, 67-72 and al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa al-tabaqah al-‘amilah al-Misriyyah, 119-149. 
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to undermine the Arab-Muslim roots of contemporary Egypt.13 Meanwhile, it pleased the 
Copts and she was invited to give talks in churches and other Christian gatherings. 
Christians still celebrate this work as a rare case when a Muslim historian gives 
credibility to the Coptic voice.14
 
 She declined to accept any offers to fund her research, 
particularly from Egyptian Coptic émigrés abroad. Before moving the discussion to the 
Bint al-Ard Group, it is important to note that although the journal of the group published 
some of al-Misri’s articles, al-Misri never joined the group and until her premature death 
in June 2000, she acted solely as an individual activist and intellectual. 
Daughters of the Land, the Provincial Feminists 
Located away from Cairo-centered politics and within the more closed provincial 
communities, the group of Bint al-Ard was active in the towns of al-Mansura, al-Mahalla 
al-Kubra and Bani Suef and some other villages in the Delta between 1982 and the late 
1990s. The group is most unique in that it started in the town of al-Mansura and, although 
it branched off in several locations in Lower and Upper Egypt, it never tried to have a 
base in Cairo. This experience suggests that there is much room to explore feminist 
activism in Arab provincial towns. The dynamics might be different from those who act 
in the major capital cities. The group stemmed out of a dissenting student movement that 
was itself a coalition of Nasserist, Marxist, and other leftist-leaning students. The student 
movement focused on opposing Anwar Sadat and Husni Mubarak’s policies towards the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, the elimination of the state’s commitment to social welfare, and the 
socioeconomic shift towards Western capitalism that had been taking place since the 
1970s. After participating in the Egyptian Committees to Support the Lebanese and the 
Palestinian Peoples that was formed in the wake of the Israeli invasion of Beirut and the 
massacres of Palestinians in the refugee camps in 1982, female student activists in al-
Mansura University transformed their association into a feminist group. They developed 
their seasonal activities around the Arab cause into a permanent association focusing on 
emancipation and empowering women in Egyptian society. The name of the group Bint 
al-Ard, Daughter of the Land, was generated from the pioneering Egyptian feminist Doria 
Shafik’s magazine Bint al-Nil, Daughter of the Nile.15
                                                          
13 For such critique see Fahmi Huwaidi, “Qadaruna ann na‘ish”[It’s our fate to live], al-Ahram, December 
1, 1998, Op-ed section. 
 It also reflects their association 
with their provincial, and even rural, origins and setting. Their focus on local activism 
governed their work and emphasized their choice to reach out to local communities and 
not be lured to Cairo. Although they never called their group a Marxist communist group, 
the founders and the core members of the group adopted Marxism. It’s important to note 
that Egyptian law has criminalized communist activities since 1924, which might explain 
why the group was never open about their ideological choice. The group also aimed at 
establishing itself as a platform for all supporters of equal gender rights irregardless of 
any political ideology. 
14 For examples of these celebratory Coptic writings, see ‘Izzat Andarawis, “al-Mu’arikhun al-Muslimun” 
[Muslim Historians], Encyclopedia Coptic History, http://www.coptichistory.org/p1.htm. See also Free 
Christian Voice Net, “‘Ghzawat Rasuluallah’ hall kanat fi sabil allah?” [‘The Conquests of God’s 
Messengers’ was it for God’s sake?], http://www.coptichistory.org/p1.htm 
15 For a comprehensive study on Doria Shafik’s life and work, see Cynthia Nelson, Doria Shafik, Egyptian 
Feminist: A woman apart (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1996). 
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The purpose of the group, as its founders laid it out, was “to develop a fresh 
perspective for real and comprehensive women’s emancipation, to positively participate 
in (solving) questions of their societies (…) to bring women’s questions to the forefront 
of the debate, to engage in a vigorous intellectual struggle against the backward values of 
the society that ascribe to women inferiority, limitation, inability, inactive failure, 
masochism, and narcissism. Consequently men are superior and should dominate and 
turn them (women) into a commodity that is sold and bought, into a reproduction tool, 
into a hand to cook and clean, and reduce her to a limited value and role.”16
 
 The activists 
of Bint al-Ard pooled their financial sources and artistic, professional, and intellectual 
expertise to publish journals. They contributed to the mainstream and alternate media, 
and activated social networks to secure access to public places such as local cultural 
centers and the Cairo Book Fair. 
The State-Islamist Alliance against Women 
It is not difficult to understand why members of Bint al-Ard chose to focus their 
activism on women’s rights and to prioritize it above the other many causes in whose 
essential importance they believed such as social justice, democracy, human rights, and 
Palestinian rights. They were middle class women with high educational levels with 
aspirations for promising professional careers. Although they came of age under Sadat, 
they experienced the free educational system as it was set up under Nasser’s regime. 
Nasser’s regime emphasized, at least theoretically, women’s equal rights for education 
and work. They grew up in urban families in which their mothers never witnessed 
discursive pressure to wear the head covering, the hijab, and aside from socially expected 
modesty they never had to conform to any Islamic dress code. Intellectually, secularism 
formed their world views, socialism and egalitarianism between men and women across 
social classes informed their political activism in the student and nationalist movements. 
While they were finishing their education, they realized that the social and professional 
life they had expected and aspired to was vanishing under the continuing and blunt anti-
women discourses of the late 1970s and 1980s. They witnessed the elimination of state 
feminism under Sadat’s and Mubarak’s regimes. With the retreat of the state as a social 
and economic agent of change, many official commitments to gender equality were either 
ignored or abandoned both inside and outside the state sector. The ideological and 
economic vacuum was filled by local entrepreneurs and international capitalist 
enterprises that were hostile to the quest for economic and social equality for women.17
One of the issues that the state and the Islamists had agreed on since the mid 
1970s was the call for women’s withdrawal from the workplace. They considered women 




                                                          
16 Bint al-Ard, 1, June 1984, 4. 
 In 1960, men's unemployment rate was 1.9 percent and 
women's unemployment rate was 5.8 percent. In 1976, two years after Sadat introduced 
his economic liberalization policies, infitah, total unemployment shot up to 7.7 percent, 
5.5 percent for men and 29.8 percent for women. By 1986, the unemployment rates 
17 Mervat F. Hatem “Economic and political liberation in Egypt and the demise of state feminism,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 24 (1992), 231-251. 
18 The phrase “the return of women to the home” has been used as a synonym for women’s withdrawal 
from the workplace in this discourse. 
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doubled to 14.7 percent with 10 percent for men and 40.7 percent for women.19
In the legal sphere, Egyptian women were losing the little protection they had 
gained toward the end of Sadat’s presidency. The presidential decrees of 1979 that 
guaranteed women a quota of 30-parliamentary-seats, granted the wife the right to a 
divorce if her husband took another wife, and assured the divorced mother who had 
custody of the children the right to stay in the family house were abolished by the mid 
1980s. The biggest success of the anti-women discourses was in changing the public 
culture in favor of the Islamic hijab. That dress code met the needs of women coming 
from conservative and rural areas for the privacy that they lost when they left their 
familiar social setting in the family home or in the village. Due to its thriftiness, Islamic 
dress released women with limited financial sources from the expenses of continually 
changing “non-Islamic” fashion and cosmetic expenses. It also implied the religious 
devotion of the woman who was wearing it and hopes of protection from the phenomenal 
sexual harassment of women in the workplaces, streets and in public transportation.  
 The 
government’s programs of economic restructuring and readjustment since the early 1990s 
worsened women’s opportunities for jobs. The Islamists’ call for women’s withdrawal 
from work and public space was an ideological stand, and the state discerned that 
endorsing that call was a way to blame women for the high rate of unemployment. It was 
easy for the state and the Islamists to accuse working women of taking work 
opportunities from men, overloading the transportation system and causing a moral 
decline. Secular and religious opponents of women's employment stressed the adverse 
effects that it had on the family and children. There was a wave of movies and TV shows 
and press articles carrying the message that working mothers were behind children’s drug 
addiction and other vices. Blaming women was a way to silence calls for the state and 
major private employers to fulfill their legal commitments to provide social services such 
as daycare and quality education and transportation systems.  
Despite the discourse against women’s work and its relative popularity among 
men and women, giving up work proved to be impractical and contradicted the needs of 
working women and their families for an income. The liberalization of the Egyptian 
economy caused high inflation and prices skyrocketed making it too difficult for middle 
and working class families to live on one income. Islamist parliament members proposed 
compensating women who gave up work with half of her salary. This proposal was 
concerned with women working for the government and public companies and excluded 
women working for private companies. Poor women working in marketplaces and as 
domestic servants were totally irrelevant to this discourse. These poor women were not 
competing with men nor expected anything from the state, consequently it was easy for 
Islamists and the state to ignore them. Although none of these proposals fully 
materialized, the state encouraged state-employees to use early retirement and made it 
possible for mothers to have multi-year unpaid leaves. The biggest achievement of these 
proposals was actually the devaluation of women’s work in the eyes of men and women 
and the society as whole. It was demoralizing for educated middle class women who 
pursued work just to fulfill a pressing need for income not as a means for self-fulfillment 
or creativity. 
These discourses launched by politicians affiliated with the state and political 
Islamists in parliament, the media, and schools went on for several years with very little 
                                                          
19 Widad Murqus, Sukkan misr [Egypt’s Population] (Cairo: Markaz al-Buhuith al-'Arabiyya, 1988), 45. 
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challenge due to the suppression of the secular opposition. While Sadat’s authoritarian 
regime with the democratic décor initially encouraged and co-operated with Islamists, it 
suppressed secular liberals and leftists for more than a decade. It harassed the Tagamu‘ 
party until the party suspended its newspaper al-Ahali.20 The secular Wafd party was 
denied a return to politics until 1984, three years after Sadat’s assassination. The 
intensive anti-women discourses by conservative Islamists and the state brought women’s 
right into the forefront for secular female activists and engendered its countering 
discourse and activism. The veteran feminist Nawal al-Sa‘dawi established the 
Association of Arab Women's Solidarity (AAWS) in 1985, and the Tagamu‘ Party 
established the Progressive Women’s Union in 1982 among other women’s associations 
that were affiliated with either professional syndicates or political parties. The Wafd, al-
Ahrar (Liberal) and the ‘Amal al-Ishtiraki (Socialist Labor) parties formed committees 
for women’s affairs. The effectiveness of these organizations was limited due to the 
marginalized positions they enjoyed in their parties, in addition to the continuing official 
policies to marginalize the opposition parties as a whole. Meanwhile, the secular 
opposition faced losing momentum through getting in alliances with the regime or with 
Islamists themselves.21 All these circumstances put the Islamist discourses in a stronger 
position in convincing middle classes that they had a solution for their socio-economic 
problems. With the state’s withdrawal from the social welfare commitment and with the 
spread of Islamism, more women articulated their feminisms within the discourse of 
religion. There was an increasing use of religious argumentation by secular feminism in 
addition to a new feminism employing Islamic discourse as its paramount discourse, 
often referred to as Islamic feminism.22 But with their Marxist social and economic 
perspective, Sana al-Misri and Bint al-Ard analyzed  women issues as socio-cultural issue 
connected to the dynamic of gender as a social/sexual relation of domination in a 
patriarchal society and materialist conditions related to their roles in production and 




Independent Women Activists 
Bint al-Ard was unique, not only because it carried out its activities outside Cairo 
in 1982, but also because it was absolutely independent from any political affiliation and 
it rejected the international funding that supported Nawal al-Sa‘dawi’s AAWS and many 
                                                          
20 For a detail account on how Sadat’s regime treated the Tagamu’ Party and its newspaper, see Husayn 
‘Abd al-Raziq, al-Ahali sahifa tahta al-hisar [al-Ahali is a newspaper under siege] (Cairo, Dar al-‘Alam al-
Thalith, 1992). 
21 I’m referring here to the alliance between al-Wafd, al-Ahrar and al-‘Amal parties with the Muslim 
Brotherhood Group during the parliamentary election in 1984, then between al-Ahrar and al-‘Amal parties 
and the MB in the parliamentary election and the eventual mergence of al-‘Amal party in the MB. I’m also 
referring to the agreement between the al-Tajamu‘ Progressive Party and the regime concerning the 
treatment of Islamists which has undermined the position of the party among its followers. For the recent 
cooperation between some leftists with Islamists, see Maha Abdelrahman, “‘With the Islamists?—
Sometimes. With the State?—Never!’ Cooperation between the Left and Islamists in Egypt”, British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, April 2009, 36(1), 37–54. 
22 See Zakia Salime, “Mobilizing Muslim Women: Multiple Voices, the Sharia, and the State”, 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2008, pp, 200-211. 
23Margot Badran, “Locating Feminisms: The Collapse of Secular and Religious Discourses in the 
Mashriq,” Agenda, No. 50, 41-57. 
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others. Although the group appreciated the need of Egyptian women to organize 
themselves and to collectively defend their rights, they declined to join any political 
party, including the secular al-Tagamu‘ Progressive Party. The group rejected the 
democratic façade of political parties and accused these parties of not being genuinely 
supportive of women’s rights. As the group put it “parties, including the progressive one, 
ignore the specificity of women’s issues. Women and their problems come at the bottom 
of parties’ programs as a general protocol when these programs deal with problems of 
transportation, sewage, women and children!! It is only to fill space with vague 
meaningless words”.24  The group also feared that the tight police restrictions and 
regulations imposed on the parties could handicap the women’s movement from 
attracting the masses of working women, housewives, and female students should the 
women’s organization affiliate with any of these political parties.25 The group put forth 
their vision for an association that should be capable of organizing the vast majority of 
women around their rights and interests as “democratic, multiple, and independent 
organizations for women only (…) efficient under women’s leadership and completely 
independent from the government that has long experience in aborting any 
organization.”26 Their insistence on building an independent democratic women’s 
movement did not stop them from supporting Farida al-Naqqash, the female candidate of 
the Progressive Party who ran in the parliamentary election in 1987 for the Mansura area. 
They campaigned for her and gave her a platform. Several members of the group were 
also engaged in broader coalitions of activism concerned with the environment, the labor 
movement, and human rights issues and emphasized the link between women’s rights and 
comprehensive socio-political reform.27
The core members of the group were leftist middle class women. They were 
highly educated with degrees from scientific and technical colleges, in the fields of 
engineering and agriculture in particular. The group defined their audience as educated 
college and secondary school women and also solicited the support of enlightened men in 
their community and families. To reach that audience they had to face two major 
obstacles. The first was the authoritarian state that employed the emergency law to curtail 
the citizens’ rights of assembly and expression. Second, they had to contend with the 
Islamists, who enjoyed more appeal among a wide range of audiences under the banner 
of reviving religion and authentic traditions. Bint al-Ard maneuvered to create and 
enlarge any possible opportunity to make their voice heard and publicize their ideas. 
Despite their commitment to independence, they shrewdly used public spaces and sources 
under state control to meet, organize, network and to publish their annual journal Bint al-
Ard. They used local branches of the secular parties in Mansura to hold forums and host 
speakers with dissenting social views. They hosted a public debate whose key speaker 
was the controversial feminist Nawal al-Sa‘dawi in March 1983. That forum attracted a 
crowd of men and women and youth and parents to discuss the position of women and 
their rights in Islam. In that early phase, the group tried to argue that Islam is an 
egalitarian religion that endorses equality between men and women. They quickly gave 
  
                                                          
24 “Tariq al-Khalas” [The Salivation path,] Bint al-Ard 2, September 1985.  
25 Ibid.   
26 Ibid.  
27 This “normativety” might explain why a scholar categorized the group as Muslim feminists rather than 
class feminist. See Salime, “Mobilizing Muslim Women”. 
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up that line of argumentation and called for absolute emancipation for women and men so 
that they both can carry on their social responsibilities.    
Though Bint al-Ard profited by using the facilities of political parties, these 
parties attracted only a limited audience who were already politicized, willing to 
challenge the state’s effort to contain opposition parties, and more importantly already 
shared the group’s progressive views and attitude towards women’s rights in general. To 
avoid the pitfalls of many Egyptian leftist activists that made them a scattering of small 
closed intellectual groups, they mobilized their social network to give them access to 
public facilities such as local culture centers. In their quest to attract wider audiences, 
particularly young females who were deterred from the type of open political 
participation as perceived by attendance at political parties’ facilities, the group utilized 
their social network to gain permission to organize weekly meetings in the Mansura 
Cultural Center. Although it was under government control, the group was able to have a 
weekly meeting there for several years. During these meetings they discussed dissenting 
books and articles related to women’s issues. More importantly these meetings were open 
to the public, which helped to recruit new members and attract wider audiences. 
The group succeeded in recruiting activists who took their ideas outside al-
Mansura to the town of al-Mahalla al-Kubra, Kafr ‘Antar, Dikirnis and other surrounding 
villages. By enrolling an activist from Upper Egypt, the group established a branch in 
Bani Suef. The local branches acted along the same model of al-Mansura. Each branch 
built its own collection of feminist writings and printed materials on women’s issues. 
Periodic meetings were held in a local cultural center or in a private home and a core 
member of the Mansura group attended. The local groups were much smaller and most of 
their meetings were held in a private home rather than in a public place. Wherever Bint 
al-Ard acted they radicalized public places, including those controlled by the state, and 
blurred the line between private and public spaces. In these maneuvers they went as far as 
proposing to devote one room in the family apartment of one of the members to house the 
group should the government grant them a license as a registered social society.  
The group also networked with feminist writers in the state controlled press, like 
Sana’ al-Bisi who was then the editor of the Nisf al-Dunya magazine, and Iqbal Baraka, 
the editor of the Hawwa’ magazine. Both editors welcomed the group and wrote in favor 
of their annual journal. The group and its annual journal enjoyed similar support from the 
Progressive oppositional newspaper al-Ahali. The group members funded, edited, and 
distributed the journal. They targeted their readership at female high school and college 
students. They also solicited donations to sustain the publication. The Cairo Book Fair 
was a good occasion for them to distribute their journal and to meet many intellectuals 
and activists whom they did not ordinarily get to meet outside Cairo. In many cases, 
readers asked to buy the old editions upon reading the latest edition. The group needed 
help with the process of production. Until the group recruited a member with expertise in 
design and publication layout, the group resorted to male professionals who volunteered 
to help. For several years ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Gamal al-Din of the state publishing house Dar 
al-Ma‘arif took care of the artistic aspect of the production. Gamal al-Din had long 
experience in the production of non-periodical journals or what was known in Cairo 
throughout the 1980s as the al-mastirs magazine. To overcome laws that made it 
impossible for individuals and independent groups to issue periodicals and restricted that 
right to parties and companies with large amounts of capital, young leftist intellectuals 
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issued these publications. Although they were journals, each edition was legally treated 
as an individual book in terms of registration procedures. These publications developed 
their distinctive aesthetic features in covers, designs and colorful papers. Almost all these 
magazines were Cairo-based and concerned with literary genres such as poetry, novellas, 
and short stories. Bint al-Arad was the only publication concerned with feminist issues 
and it survived longer. Although its members lived and acted outside Cairo, their 
seriousness and commitment made Bint al-Ard unique in the intellectual scene in Cairo. 
Consequently, renowned artists such as the painter ‘Adli Rizqallah, the cartoonists Higazi 
and ‘Izz al-‘Arab, and the calligrapher Hamid al-‘Uwaydi published their art in Bint al-
Ard. The group also republished the classic works of the Egyptian artists Mahmud Sa‘id 
and Inji Aflatun. The later was considered one of the pioneering Egyptian feminists. 
For a deeper understanding for the social reality, values, needs, aspirations and 
problems faced by different sectors of Egyptian women, the group conducted a series of 
surveys on the conditions of working women, women’s opinions about withdrawing from 
the workplace, political culture and awareness among the youth, and the religious views 
of female university students. 28 They also interviewed women from the lower classes 
such as industrial and construction workers.29 Professors of sociology helped the group to 
analyze the data, which made these surveys and interviews helpful in understanding the 
realities of Egyptian women at the local level. This systematic empirical knowledge was 
a serious response to the lack of information on provincial women in the secular 
discourse of the Cairo-based public sphere. The journal also boldly dealt with sensitive 
issues that had been overlooked such as women’s sexuality and female genital 
mutilation30, the emotional pain of Egyptian women in the Arab Persian Gulf states,31 
and tensions between Muslims and Christians.32
 
 Noticeably, the Palestinian cause was 
always a recurring subject in every edition of the journal.  
When the West Came! 
In their search for an indigenous Arab and Egyptian project of women’s 
emancipation, Bint al-Ard rejected the European model “that treats women’s issues away 
from the social and class struggles, it limits (women) to an adversary of men and 
encourages women to rebel against men to the extent of refusing marriage and 
reproduction”. That statement shows that the group was not well aware of different 
Western feminism(s), which could have been a result of their inability to read foreign 
languages. Yet, the group warmly received the African-American activist Angela Davis 
in al-Mansura in April 1986 and endorsed her research on Egyptian women’s sexuality.33
                                                          
28 Jihan al-Sayyid, Fatin Muhammad and Hala Isma‘il, “Dhahira wa ra’i: Istiqsa’ hawla mawdu‘ ‘awdit al-
mar’a lil-manzil” [A phenomena and an opinion: A survey on the returning women to the houses,] Bint al-
Ard 1, June 1984, 6-19, and Thuraya ‘Abd al-Radi, “La talumu al-shabab,” [Don’t blame the youth,] Bint 
al-Ard, 6, 1990, 27-34. 
 
Their stand was remarkable considering the rejection that visit and the sensitive purpose 
29 “Wujuh kadiha” [Toiling faces], Bint al-Ard, 6 and 7, 27- 30 and 22-25.  
30 “Angela Davis wa ziyaratiha li-Misr” [Angela Davis and her visit to Egypt], Bint al-Ard 2, December 
1985, 22-24.  
31 “Al-Dumu‘ fi al-manazil” [Tears at homes], Bint al-Ard 6, 22-26. 
32 Magda Siyyduhum, “Laqatat” [shots,] Bint al-Ard 6, 19-20 and  Mary Georg, “Amina wa Maryam” 
[Amina and Maryam,] Bint al-Ard, 8, 18-19. 
33 “Angela Davis”. 
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provoked in the official media. The group rejected Western funds that started to support 
civil society organizations after the World Conference on Women in Nairobi. A 
conference organized by Nawal al-Sa‘dawi’s AAWS in 1987 and funded by the Ford 
Foundation was the first event to open the heated debate over this type of funding among 
Egyptian activists. A leak of information about the sources of funding was a huge blow to 
the conference and Bint al-Ard along with other participants, withdrew. This was a 
landmark in the group’s relations with the charismatic feminist al-Sa‘adawi. At its 
inception, the group was close to al-Sa‘dawi whom they admired for her contributions to 
women’s issues. They invited her in a public forum in al-Mansura and endorsed her talk 
in which she connected exploitative capitalism and women’s inferior position. The 
group’s first publication included one article and one short story by al-Sa‘dawi’s daughter 
Muna Hilmi. Al-Sa‘dawi also provided the group with a great deal of encouragement. 
Ambitious to build a movement beyond intellectual circles and in an attempt to 
incorporate working class women in a movement that aimed at improving their life and 
working conditions, Bint al-Ard started a project to train poor women in surrounding 
villages in a weaving workshop. Financial support for that project was supposed to be 
provided by al-Sa‘dawi’s AAWS. Upon realizing that al-Sa‘dawi’s organization was 
funded by the Ford Foundation and other international donors, the group chose to 
suspend the project. Ambivalence about funds coming from the West and questions about 
the hidden agendas of international donors made the group refuse the funds, while no 
other source was available. The project never materialized for lack of money.  
The ideological rift between the group and al-Sa‘dawi was widened when the 
latter started publishing her magazine Nun in the late 1980s propagating ideas closer to 
the type of Western feminism that Bint al-Ard had rejected earlier. Nun carried views that 
the group thought to be irrelevant to Egyptian women, such as free love versus the 
institution of marriage, reproducing children outside marriage, and equating marriage to 
slavery.34 These ideas echoed what Bint al-Ard deemed as “encouraged by the Western 
capitalist government to distract mass women from confronting capitalist exploitation”.35 
In a comparison between Bint al-Ard and al-Sa‘dawi’s organization, an Egyptian-
American scholar wrote that “initiative and feminist awareness of women outside of 
Cairo, and the popular perspectives and diverse activities carried out by Bint al-Ard (…) 
made them more representative of Egyptian feminism at the present stage”.36
 
 Although 
the group disagreed with al-Sa‘adawi and suspended any cooperation with her 
organization, they kept friendly relations with her and declined to join those who wrote in 
the conservative press against her. They kept appreciating al-Sa‘dawi’s courage and 
sacrifices for what she believed, in addition to the moral encouragement she provided the 
group at its inception. 
Confronting the Comrades  
                                                          
34 “Limadha tas‘ad al-mar'ah bi-al-hubb wa tashqa bil-zawaj?" [Why women are happy in love and 
miserable in marriage?” and " Urid al-amuma wa la urid al-rajul," [I want motherhood, I don’t want the 
man] Nun 1 (May, 1989), 6-8 and 9. See also Muna Hilmi, "Mas'ibi al-thalath," [My three difficulties,] Nun 
3 (November, 1989), 54-55. 
35 “Tariq al-Khalas”.  
36 Hatem “Economic and political liberation in Egypt”. 
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It is fair to say that Sana’ al-Misri was more vocally extremist than the members of Bint 
al-Ard in her rejection for Western funding of the Egyptian NGOs. Beyond Bint al-Ard’s 
quiet withdrawal from any Western-funded activity, al-Misri wrote two books 
denouncing what she thought to be the political and moral fall of the Egyptian left.37 
Since the early 1990s, a human rights perspective in Egypt became a widely accepted 
framework for women’s activism and to many political activists of the 1970s the notion 
of human rights presented an alternative to earlier forms of socialist struggle. 38 The 
mushrooming of centers working on human rights is probably one of the most obvious 
outcomes of the influence of international agendas and donor organizations.39 Al-Misri 
wrote that leftist activists who accepted international funds compromised their anti-
Western capitalist views and traded their national agenda with imperialist agendas.40
In two books al-Misri suggested that Western agencies have provided Egyptian 
activists with generous funds to facilitate their acceptance of Israel and its aggressive 
policies against the Palestinians, a goal that the peace agreements between Egypt and 
Israel have failed to achieve.
 She 
insisted on equating Western funds with tatbi‘, or normalizing relations with Israel. Since 
the Camp David Accords dictated normalizing relations between the peoples of Egypt 
and Israel, many Egyptian organizations including political parties, Labor Unions, the 
Egyptian Writers’ Union and the professional syndicates have been committed not to be 
involved in relations with their Israeli counterparts. Committing tatbi‘, or participating in 
common activities with Israelis has become taboo among Egyptian intellectuals and 
activists. With the launching of the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians in 
Madrid in 1991 and the concluding of the Oslo Accords in early 1993, the fear of 
breaking the taboo of normalization, tatbi‘, rose high. The declaration of the International 
Coalition for Peace in Copenhagen between Israeli and Egyptian intellectuals and the 
establishment of the Cairo Society for Peace in 1997 increased anxiety among leftists 
about the normalization of relations under Camp David. 
41
                                                          
37 Sana’ al-Misri, Tatbi‘ wa tamwil: Qissat al-jam‘iyyat ghayr al-hukumiyya [Normalization and funding: 
The story of the non-government organizations] 2 volumes (Cairo: Sina lil-Nashr, 1998) and (Cairo: 
Markaz al-Nadim lil-Abhath wa al-Ma‘lumat, 1999).  
 The second book was hastily published when the 
conference of the Copenhagen Coalition for Peace was held in Cairo and attended by the 
former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres in 1999. The revenue of that book was 
donated to the Arab Committee for Resisting Normalization. Al-Misri led a few dozen 
activists in demonstration outside the hotel where the conference was held. She had led 
similar protests when the Israeli ambassador in Cairo attended the Cairo Book Fair in the 
previous year. Despite the validity of some of al-Misri’s critiques of the Western funded 
organizations, she did not provide tangible evidence that all Western funds were 
conditioned on normalizing relations with Israel. Meanwhile, these organizations helped 
to restore the dynamic of civil society and attracted international attention to some 
aspects of the government abuse of human rights. They succeeded in what a scholar on 
the public sphere called engendering an international sphere beyond the domestic 
38 al-Ali, Secularism, Gender, and the State in the Middle East,112. 
39 Ibid. 
40 al-Misri, Tatbi‘ wa tamwil, Vol. 1, Chapter 1 in particular. 
41 Sana’ al-Misri, Tatbi‘ wa tamwil, Vol. 1, 56- 61 and the entire Vol. 2.  
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sphere.42
Despite operating in discrete areas, many agreements brought al-Misri and Bint 
al-Ard together in the early 1990s. Although Al-Misri never became a group member in a 
full sense, she actively contributed to their publications. She published a critique of the 
religious media celebrity Sheikh Muhammad Mutawali al-Sha‘rawi and participated in 
the group’s interview with the secularist author Husayn Ahmad Amin.
 Due to this achievement, the Egyptian government launched legal and media 
campaigns to bring these organizations under its control. It’s noteworthy to emphasize 
that al-Misri refused all government attempts to engage her in these campaigns. 
43 Al-Misri and 
Bint al-Arad wanted to build on the achievement of the Egyptian enlightenment at the 
turn of the 20 century but were very critical of the neo-secularist who used the old 
discourse to give legitimacy to women’s right to work and participate in the public 
sphere. They exposed the limitation of the 19th and early 20th century enlightenment 
project as articulated by Rifa‘a Tahtawi, Qasim Amin, Muhammad Abdu and Rashid 
Rida.44 They adopted the “holistic approach” that positioned women’s inferiority in the 
Egyptian society in both social class and gender oppression. They saw that working class 
men and women were oppressed because of the capital dependant system and poor 
women were oppressed in their family by the male members of the household because of 
the unfair gender relations.45 They not only advocated women’s right to work, but also 
women’s right to enjoy and be creative at work. These rights would not be fulfilled if 
working women were oppressed in their family, overloaded with all the housework with 
no help from males or the state, and their work is not appreciated or trusted at the 
workplace or in the society.46 The  call for change was not only to improve working 
conditions for women by better transportation, daycare services etc, but also the call of 
cultural change to appreciate women’s contribution to the society and endorsement for 
women to enjoy life and work.47
Neither Bint al-Ard nor Sana’ al-Masri tried to tap religious arguments to support 
their views over gender equality. Although secularist speakers in the forums of Bint al-
 They situated the anti-women discourses in the crisis of 
capitalism in Egypt and the vulnerability of the bourgeois project of enlightenment. They 
called for emancipation for both men and women in a socialist system where everybody 
enjoys a just and happy life. They cited women’s oppression in a wider social context and 
considered it part and result of the lack of political democracy and social justice. In other 
words, emancipating women and promoting their status in the society is not divorced 
from the struggle for public liberties, political democracy, and comprehensive social 
reforms that benefit men and women of all classes. The capitalist state which had been 
facing continuing crises embodied in its withdrawal from social welfare and the increase 
in unemployment had found in the conservatives anti-women discourse a partial solution 
that shifted attention away from its failures.  
                                                          
42 Valentine Moghadam, Globalizing Women: Transnational Feminist Networks (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2005), 4. 
43Sana’ al-Misri, “al-Shaykh al-Sha‘rawi wa al-rijal al-masakin” [Sheikh al-Sha‘rawi and the poor men], 
Bint al-Ard 7, July 1992, 45-49 and “Hiwar ma‘a rajul mutasha’im lakinahu mazala uqatil”, [A 
conversation with a pessimistic, but is still fighting, man] Bint al-Ard 6, January 1993, 6-13.   
44 Sana’ al-Misri, Ruwwad al-Tanwir wa taqadumiyya hsab al-Talab, a book manuscript submitted for 
publication to Dar Mirit in Cairo.  
45 “Tariq al-Khalas”. 
46 al-Sayyid, Muhammad and Isma‘il, “Dhahira wa Ra’i”. 
47 Ibid. 
March 2011
 Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 12 #3 231 
Ard, such as al-Sa‘dawi and al-Naqqash, tried to emphasize the egalitarian principles of 
Islam and to show no contradiction between religion and women’s emancipation, the 
group itself declined to take up that argument.48
The success of the Bint al-Ard group might have been a major cause in its own 
end. Their publicity in Cairo and al-Mansura attracted more attention from the state’s 
agencies. The State Security Police exerted pressure to contain the group. First the 
Mansura Culture Center suspended the group’s weekly meetings. Then the police arrested 
three of the core members and detained them for one night while they were picking up 
their newly published journal from the press. The police charged them with the 
possession of illegal publications. The accusation proved to be false because their journal 
held a legal registration number in the official Dar al-Kutub. Although the Cairo-based 
opposition press rushed to defend them, the group chose the practical path. They refused 
to publicize news of their detention lest the parents of the younger members not allow 
them to continue with the group. However the incident was a harsh message that the state 
was aggressively after them, particularly when the State Security Police refused to release 
the confiscated journal.
 They believed that generating religious 
legitimacy for a political ideology and social program would put them in a weaker 
position in comparison with their Islamist foes where the audience would give more 
credit to the Islamists who enjoy higher credibility concerning religious arguments. 
Meanwhile, members of the group deliberately followed the social norm to defeat the 
stereotype that depicted feminists and female leftists as sexually loose and social deviants 
with no respect for the society or its values. They meant to have all the focus on their 
ideas and to gain credibility for their rational. The group members always dressed 
modestly and wore little or no makeup. Members were not allowed to smoke in public 
since Egyptian society imposes a stigma on women who smoke. They publicly profiled 
themselves as family women and mothers with respect for social norms. They were even 
happy when some mocked their social conservativeness by calling them al-shabbat al-
shuy‘iyat, the young communist women, which echoed the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
women’s organization, al-Shabbat al-Muslimat, the Young Muslim Women. 
49 Preventing the group from access to public spaces was critical 
particularly with the authoritarian laws that curtailed the rights of association and public 
meetings. To overcome their possible isolation, the group decided to register themselves 
as an organization subject to the Social Affairs Ministry. They were required to have a 
meeting place. Due to the limited financial resources one of the members devoted a room 
in her apartment to host the potential organization. It was not too difficult for the 
authorities to deny the group a license with on the pretext that their place lacked a private 
bathroom or exit door, and consequently was not qualified.50
                                                          
48 Thuraya ‘Abd al-Radi, “Al-liqa’ al-fikri ma‘a al-dukturah Nawal al-Sa‘dawi hawla qadiyyat al-mar’a wa 
iltihamaha bi-qadiyat al-mujtama‘” [The intellectual meeting with Dr. Nawal al-Sa‘dawi on women’s issue 
and its integration with societal issues,] Bint al-Ard 1, June 1984, 36- 53 and Saniyya al-Bahhat, “Malaf al-
ahwal al-shakhsiyya: lamm yantahi al-sira‘” [The personal status file: the struggle has not been resolved,] 
Bint al-Ard 2, December 1985, 28- 38. 
 To rent such a place was 
almost impossible considering the lack of financial resources and the acute housing 
problem the entire country was experiencing. The group, remaining faithful to its 
49 “Musadarat Bint al-Ard” [The confiscation of Bint al-Ard,] al-Ahali, December 1990.  
50 “Qanun qatl al-jami‘yyat al-ahliyya: Shaqqa bi-hmmam shart ishhar jam‘yya nisa’yya” [The law of 
killing civil societies: an apartment with a bathroom is a condition to register a women society,] al-Ahali, 
September 1990. 
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nationalist agenda based on a socialist vision and anti-Western imperialism, rejected the 
international donors as a solution. They were very skeptical about any hidden agenda that 
might come with such funds and they preferred to be consistent with their principles. 
Members of the group were not flawless. Local fame, immaturity, and the inconsistency 
of some of them made the continuation of the group challenging. Although Bint al-Ard 
was still small in membership with a very loosely defined leadership, the hierarchy 
reflected the financial privileges and the social hierarchy of their male households. Those 
who inherited this leadership grew hungry for notoriety, while other members were 
perhaps not mature enough to treat this course with patience and they withdrew rather 
than attempting to reform. Others shifted their attention to their own professional life and 
career. 
 Although the group disintegrated by the end of the 1990s, its legacy is still 
tangible in the lives and activism of its ex-members. Some of them moved to Cairo where 
they employed their skills in building organizations, editing publications, working as 
professional journalists or took up positions in feminist organizations. Two members 
acquired doctoral degrees and pursued careers in American academia. The legacy of 
Sana’ al-Misri has been always celebrated in secular Arab circles beyond Egypt.51 
Although her uncompromising views angered many fellow activists, her sudden 
premature death came as a huge loss for the secular and leftist movements as revealed in 




While the spread of Islamism against the backdrop of the crises of the 
postcolonial nation-state, which made more women with different perspectives articulate 
their feminisms within the discourse of religion, Marxist feminists such as al-Misri and 
the Bint al-Ard group avoided the pitfall of the increasing use of religious argumentation 
by secular feminism. Unlike their contemporary secularists, they criticized the limitations 
of the founders of Islamic enlightenment traditions such as Rifa‘a al-Tahtawi, 
Muhammad Abdu and Qasim Amin.53
                                                          
51 Several Arab secularist sites have posted entire of some of Sana’ al-Misri’s books on line. For example 
see the site of Center For Women’s Equality 
 They analyzed women’s inferiority in Egyptian 
society as a product of both the unjust social class system and patriarchal culture. Despite 
a minority discourse, they shifted the debate from whether women’s work conforms with 
Islamic traditions to women’s right to work as a way to enjoy self-fulfillment, be creative, 
and contribute to her personal and social evolution. They also shifted the basis of 
women’s right to work from being a practical need to help her family and society to the 
society’s responsibility to help women to enjoy work and to be creative. They also broke 
from the standard Marxist views that connected oppression of women only to class and 
the sexual division of labor. Meanwhile, they rejected what they considered the European 
model of feminism and Western funding and support. Independent from local political 
http://www.c-we.org/ar/show.art.asp?aid=4034 and the site 
of al-‘Ilmaniyya [Secularism] http://3ilmaniya.jeeran.com/archive/2007/3/171719.html 
52 Among enormous examples see the special section on Sana’ al-Misri in Akhbar al-Adab on June 18, 
2000 and Faruq ‘Abd al-Qadir “Sana’ al-Misri: al-intifa’ qabla al-awan” [Sana’ al-Misri: premature 
depatrue], al-Musawwar, June 21, 2000, 52- 54.  
53 For critique of traditional Marxist and culturalist analysis of Middle Eastern/ Egyptian women, see 
Mervat Hatem, “Class and Patriarchy as Competing Paradigms for the Study of Middle Eastern Women” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Oct., 1987), 811-818. 
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and professional organizations and from international funding they challenged both the 
hegemonic Islamist discourse and state authoritarianism to create an alternate public 
sphere and managed to operate both inside and outside the establishment. 
March 2011
